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# THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

BY

BARON KENTARO KANEKO, LL.D.

*An address delivered before Harvard University  
under the auspices of the Japan Club of  
Harvard at Sanders Theatre  
April 28, 1904*

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CAMBRIDGE

The Japan Club of Harvard University

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## *Preface*

BARON KENTARO KANEKO delivered a learned address on "The Situation in the Far East" before a large and distinguished audience in Sanders Theatre of Harvard University, under the auspices of the Japan Club of Harvard, on April 28, 1904. All those who heard the address were deeply impressed with the righteousness of Japan's cause and the dignity and fairness of her position in the present struggle against Russian duplicity and arrogance in the extreme East. Japan's attitude was so ably and eloquently presented by Baron Kaneko that many of those who heard him requested that he put it into permanent form, and so make it accessible to the general public. Accordingly the Japan Club takes pleasure in printing the address with Baron Kaneko's permission, in order to meet the earnest wishes of their friends.

CAMBRIDGE, May 16, 1904.



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## *The Situation in the Far East*

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MR. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN :

I FEEL it to be the greatest honor ever conferred upon me that I am able to speak before so distinguished a gathering in the hall of this world-renowned University, of which I have always had most cherished memories.

In the present struggle with Russia, the peace of Asia, as well as the national existence of Japan, is at stake. It is my desire in this address to reply to the charges Russia has made against us, as well as to deal with some of the doubts which some people have expressed concerning the motives actuating Japan. I propose to show not only that Japan did not declare war until tried to the last limit of human endurance, but that in taking so grave a step she was moved not by merely territorial, or even by purely national interests, but by the same aspirations towards the progress of the race as those which characterize Anglo-Saxon civilization the world over.

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But before entering into my subject, let me direct your attention for a moment to the history of our relation to Manchuria, for the Manchurian question is not merely a Russian question. At any rate, that part of Manchuria which is known as the Liaotung Peninsula was occupied by a Japanese army in the year 1895, during the war with China; and when the war ended, those territories were given to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. We won them, remember, by force of arms — they came to us as spoils of victory. But what happened after the signing of that treaty? Hardly was the ink dry on it before the three great European powers — Russia, France, and Germany — stepped in, and, in order to justify their interference, declared that any holding of Manchurian territory by Japan would constitute a menace to the peace of Asia. Now consider in what situation that extraordinary announcement found us. We had just emerged from a costly, not to say ruinous, war. We had lost both blood and treasure. Our armies had been decimated and our battleships shattered. In this weakened condition we were suddenly confronted by a new and more powerful antagonist who, in the persons of Russia, France, and Germany, unceremoniously summoned us “to stand and deliver.” Well, that was something like our situation; and as there was no choice for us, except between fighting and yielding, we had to



submit to the demands of the three powers. In order to avert a supposed menace to the peace of Asia, we were compelled to give back to China the territories we had rightfully acquired. But that was only the beginning of the matter. In our simplicity, we imagined that those territories — that the Manchurian Peninsula — would revert to the Chinese Empire and remain an integral part of it. It never entered into our heads to imagine that Russia would ultimately come into possession of them. Yet so it happened; for by way of diplomacy, Russia soon obtained in lease the very same region of the peninsula which, after acquiring it with our armies, the three European powers had compelled us to return to China. Nor was it the end yet. Russia now made her preparations for the waiting game from which she had so much to expect; all she needed was some incident in the progress of events that would enable her to completely Russianize the territory on which her foot had already been planted. Her opportunity came in 1900 with the Boxer trouble, for Russia, availing herself of this outbreak of fanaticism in China, began to pour her troops into Manchuria, and did not desist until the whole of that province had been occupied.

Once in possession, Russia never relinquished her hold on the territory, and her future plans regarding it have been repeatedly expressed by

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her diplomats in the phrase "fitly paralleling a former declaration of divine right, 'There we are, and there we shall stay!'"

And now what next? The Japanese have an undeniable faculty of observation, and for some years after that occupation we watched to see what Russia would do. It was not long before we found her building a railroad to the terminal point on the Liaotung Peninsula. Meanwhile, she fortified Port Arthur and almost doubled its strength as a strategical position; later we observed that she had converted the harbor of Port Arthur into a port which she exclusively reserved for the purposes of a Russian naval base by forbidding its use to the ships of other nations, and therefore to the commerce of the world. Then came Russia's extension of her Chinese Eastern Railroad towards the Yalu River, and the Korean frontier; her choice of Harbin as her headquarters and military base; and her erection of barracks along the lines of railroad in Manchuria. She had all the time been flooding the province with her soldiers, as well as taking other measures which obviously contemplated its incorporation into the empire. Noteworthy also was the agreement by which she obtained the cession, from the government of Korea, of Yongampo on the southern bank of the Yalu River. Here was a characteristic bit of Russian diplomacy. Russia had the pretext

of the enormous forest lands which she owns in the upper ranges of the Yalu, and she obtained Yongampo ostensibly as "a river basin" in which to receive her timber as it came down the stream. Last year, as a result of the concession to Russia, we had a good deal of trouble over Yongampo; permission to land there was refused to one of our legation members in Seoul, and while the negotiations were going on, it was suspected that Russia intended to convert the place into a fortification.

Now this occupation of Manchuria by Russia, together with Russia's manifest intention to extend her influence into Korean territory, had a bearing on the interests of Korea and Japan that could not be ignored. Besides threatening the integrity and independence of Korea, they aimed at the rights and existing interests of Japan in Korea, and through these came to be a menace to our very existence as a nation. And it was this situation — recognized by the American and European governments as well as by Japan — that led us to open up negotiations with Russia, our object being to reach some peaceful arrangement, some amicable understanding, whereby all future trouble with her regarding Manchuria and Korea could be avoided. On July 28, therefore, we addressed a diplomatic note to the Russian government containing the following:

"The Imperial Japanese Government, believ-

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ing that the Imperial Russian Government share with them the desire to remove from the relations of the two empires every cause of future misunderstanding, would be glad to enter with the Imperial Russian Government upon examination of the condition of affairs in the extreme East, where their interests meet, with a view to definition of their respective special interests in those regions. If, as is confidently hoped, this suggestion meets approval in principle, the Imperial Japanese Government will be prepared to present to the Imperial Russian Government their views as to the nature and scope of the proposed understanding."

This suggestion was carried out, the Russian government finally agreeing to open negotiations with Japan. The Japanese government thereupon drew up proposals as the basis of negotiations, and these proposals were submitted to Count Lamsdorff on August 12, 1903, it being clearly stated therein that the negotiations were to settle the matter relating to Manchuria and Korea. Then followed long delay on the part of Russia. During this we sent frequent notes, asking when we were to be informed of Russia's intentions, — we asked Russia many times what she intended to do, but she never gave a satisfactory answer. Sometimes she changed the seat of negotiations to Tokio, and did this in spite of protest. Even after the negotiations

were thus transferred, she had to consult with many officials and dignitaries with the result of further delay, during all of which we waited in the hope of getting the desired reply.

After full five months' delay, on December 11, 1903, the Russian counter-proposals were received by our government. It was a surprise to us to find from these that Russia had stricken out Manchuria, and had confined herself entirely to Korea. Japan thereupon offered counter-proposals, restoring the omitted clauses bearing on Manchuria, and making her suggestions relate, as before, to both Manchuria and Korea. Another delay ensued, and repeated requests for an early answer were made by the Japanese government, but again without avail.

What was Russia doing all this time? On the one hand, beginning with last summer, she was negotiating for a peaceful settlement with Japan, and was continually expressing her hope that peace would result; on the other, she was making warlike preparations on both land and sea, and these were almost appalling. We could not realize how a nation which expected to reach a peaceful understanding could at the same time so openly prepare for war. The longer, in fact, we delayed, the more threatening became the situation. We therefore addressed an ultimatum to the Russian government, asking them to give us a date on which we should receive their reply.

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As no definite answer came, we found our patience exhausted. They had refused satisfaction to our modest demand and reasonable proposals. Only one course was now open to us. That course our minister for foreign affairs took by addressing the following telegram, dated February 5, 1904, 2.15 P.M., to our minister at St. Petersburg:—

“In the presence of delays which remain largely unexplained, and naval and military activities which it is difficult to reconcile with entirely pacific aims, the Imperial Government have exercised in the depending negotiations a degree of forbearance which they believe affords abundant proof of their loyal desire to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government every cause for future misunderstanding. But finding in their efforts no prospect of securing from the Imperial Russian Government an adhesion either to Japan’s moderate and unselfish proposals, or to any other proposals likely to establish a firm and enduring peace in the extreme East, the Imperial Government have no other alternative than to terminate the present futile negotiations.

“In adopting that course the Imperial Government reserve to themselves the right to take such independent action as they may deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position, as well as to protect their established rights and legitimate interests.

"The Imperial Government of Japan, having exhausted without effect every means of conciliation with a view to the removal from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government of every cause for future complications, and finding that their just representations and moderate and unselfish proposals in the interest of a firm and lasting peace in the extreme East are not receiving the consideration which is their due, have resolved to sever their diplomatic relations with the Imperial Russian Government, which for the reason named have ceased to possess any value.

"In further fulfilment of the command of his Government, the undersigned has also the honor to announce to His Excellency, Count Lamsdorff, that it is his intention to take his departure from St. Petersburg with the staff of the Imperial Legation."

Note the date of the telegram, for it is very important: "February 5, 2.15 P.M."

The message was handed over to Count Lamsdorff by our minister at St. Petersburg at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of February 6. Simultaneously our representative informed the Russian government that, in accordance with instructions from Japan to leave the court of St. Petersburg, he should withdraw with his staff on the 10th inst. Observe from the terms of this telegram that the Japanese government reserve

to themselves the right to take such independent action as they may deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position, as well as to protect their established rights and legitimate interests. — So much for the negotiations which preceded the war ; and in dismissing them, let me add that these most difficult preliminaries were carried out by two Harvard men, — Baron Komura and Mr. Kurino, the former our Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latter our Minister to St. Petersburg.

We now come to the outbreak of hostilities. Suitably to the declaration made in our final message to the Russian government, we began to move troops to Korea, and our transports, conveyed by our torpedo boats and war vessels, reached the Bay of Chemulpo at 5 P.M. on February 8.

On the arrival of our flotilla near that harbor we met the Russian war vessel *Korietz*. She made hostile demonstrations, and fired the first shot of the war at one of our torpedo boats, which thereupon returned the fire, but unfortunately without effect,—the enemy not being struck. The *Korietz* then returned to the inner harbor. On the following day, February 9, at 8 A.M., Rear-Admiral Uriu sent a letter to the captain of the *Varyag*, challenging him to combat outside the harbor ; at the same time he addressed individual communications to the commanders of war ves-



sels of the United States, England, Italy, and France, then at Chemulpo, requesting them, in case the *Variag* and *Koriets* did not leave the harbor before noon, to change their anchorage. About 11 o'clock the same morning, the two Russian war vessels steamed from the harbor into open sea, and there, outside Chemulpo, began the first naval battle between Russia and Japan. Now let me state here one fact. Our squadron consisted of a large number of war ships, but our admiral ordered two only to meet the *Variag* and *Koriets*, the rest being required to remain at a distance, and not to take any part in the fighting. Finding themselves no match for their enemies, the *Variag* and *Koriets* returned into the harbor, where one sank and the other was blown up by the Russians.

Now as this engagement outside Chemulpo has given rise to certain unwarranted assumptions, I should like to remove them by a plain recital of facts. The Russian government claims that we violated international law in this battle by attacking our enemy in a neutral harbor. The very contrary is what happened, for Rear-Admiral Uriu scrupulously adapted his action to international usages in time of war by inviting the Russians to leave the harbor and try the issue on the open sea. If we look, therefore, to the facts, the charge that we violated international law, or even international precedent, becomes

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untenable. What, then, of the probabilities? It will surely suffice to point to the training of the officer in command. Rear-Admiral Uriu, having received his education in the Naval Academy at Annapolis, was moulded by the same influences, and had developed in him the same high sense of military honor and regard for international law, as those which contributed to the mental and moral equipment of your own Admiral Dewey and Admiral Sampson. And when this has been said, nothing more is needed to show that Rear-Admiral Uriu could not have acted otherwise at Chemulpo than he did.

But there are other charges which the Russian government brings against Japan. One of them is that we began hostilities before making a formal declaration of war. Now on such a ground no civilized nation will ever think of offering protest. The principle involved is a plainly settled doctrine of international law. It is the earliest and best known proposition in every treatise on the subject. Not to know it argues ignorance of a fundamental principle concerning which there is absolutely no room for doubt. In all the years that have elapsed since the latter part of the eighteenth century to the present day it has been recognized in practice as well as in theory, that the declaration of war is an unnecessary preliminary to the making of war, and that hostilities may begin at any moment after diplomatic

relations have been severed. Nor are precedents wanting. The Russians themselves, the Germans, the English, the United States, as well as the other European powers, have repeatedly begun hostilities before declaration of war. For a hundred years or more this principle has been accepted; and the supposition that Russia has any ground for complaint against Japan for the course she took last February rests on an assumption which is founded neither in the law nor in the facts.

But it is said that the Russians have a right of appeal to international law in the circumstances of the Japanese attack on Port Arthur.

They say that our ultimatum and the subsequent withdrawal of our minister from St. Petersburg left them no time in which to anticipate hostilities. They claim that Port Arthur was altogether unprepared. Now what of the dates? The attack complained of came on February 9, while diplomatic relations were severed on February 6, three days before. Two full days elapsed after our notification, during which no act of war was committed by Japan, though she was obviously entitled to open hostilities at any moment after the breaking off of diplomatic intercourse. What again of the alleged unpreparedness of Russia? The official report on the doings at Port Arthur received from our Admiral shows that he found it difficult to get near the

Russian squadron on account of the enemy using their search-lights; we were also informed that for some time before, as well as during our attack, the Russian battleships had their decks cleared for action, and were under a full head of steam. On our launching a torpedo, moreover, the Russians immediately opened fire upon us. This would alone suffice to dispose of the claim made by Russia, in her circular that "in this war Russia was taken by surprise," that "Russia was entirely unprepared." Instead of being unprepared, we have seen that she had ample time in which to make her dispositions for war on both land and sea. But we have special evidence of what she has been doing for the last seven months in the way of preparing for hostilities. Let me cite from a report on "Russian Preparations."

"Her warlike preparations in the Far East have been going ahead since last April, when she failed to carry out her treaty engagements. During that time the increase made in her naval strength in the Far East was as follows: Three battleships, tonnage 38,488; one armored cruiser, tonnage, 7727; five cruisers, tonnage 26,417; seven destroyers, tonnage, 2450; one gunboat, tonnage 1344; two vessels for laying mines, tonnage 6000. Total number of vessels nineteen, with a total tonnage of 82,415. In addition to these vessels, the Russian Government sent torpedo

destroyers in sections by rail to Port Arthur, where the work of putting them together has been hastened, and seven of them have already been completed. Furthermore, two vessels of the volunteer fleet were armed at Vladivostok and hoisted the Russian naval ensign.

“During the same period, the increase of Russia’s land forces in the Far East has been equally marked. Since the 29th of last June, when under the pretext of trial transportation on the Siberian Railway, the Russian Government sent to China two infantry brigades, two artillery battalions, and a large force of cavalry. Troops have been constantly sent by military train from Russia to the Far East, until the Russian forces were over 40,000. At the same time, plans were being made for sending, if necessary, over 200,000 more men.

“During the same period there has been the greatest activity possible at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and the work has been carried on day and night to strengthen the fortifications of those naval ports, while forts have been built at Liao Yang, Hunchun, and other strategic points, and large quantities of arms and ammunition have been sent to the Far East by the Siberian Railway and the vessels of the volunteer fleet. In the middle of October last, a train of fourteen cars was hurriedly sent from Russia laden with the equipment of a field hospital.

"During the latter part of January and up to the beginning of February, Russian military activity was still further intensified. On January 21, about two battalions of infantry and a detachment of cavalry were sent from Port Arthur and Dalny to the northern frontier of Corea, and on January 28 a formal order to prepare for war was given by Admiral Alexieff to the forces which were stationed in the vicinity of the Yalu. On February 1, the military commandant at Vladivostok, under the orders of his government, requested the Japanese commercial agent at that port to notify his nation that a state of siege might be proclaimed at any moment, and to make immediate preparations to withdraw to Habrovsk. About the same date all of the war ships at Port Arthur, except a battleship then under repairs, made a naval demonstration by leaving port, while troops were advanced in large numbers from Liao Yang toward the Yalu."

Yet the Russian government said that Russia was unprepared. Does any sane man, after reading such reports as this, believe that Russia was unprepared? She had to such an extent utilized every moment she could gain as to give us the impression that she was deliberately pursuing the policy of delay only in order to have all the more opportunity for preparation, intending, the instant negotiations were broken off, to strike at Japan. It is in this way, knowing what prepara-

tions she actually made, that we must construe her action. We cannot regard her plea of "unpreparedness" otherwise than as a game of bluff, — an attempt to gloss over her want of success after she has been defeated.

Let me now pass to the consideration of some comparisons which have been instituted — invidiously and inappropriately, as it seems to me — between Russia and Japan. Since the war began, the whole civilized world has directed its attention to the Far East, and from the general study that has resulted into the causes of the struggle there have emerged, along with predictions of the probable result, certain declarations as to the attitude people ought to take towards the combatants. We have had a great deal of opinion, and some of it, expressed by men in high social as well as political standing, takes the ground that the present war is a struggle between paganism and Christianity. Such men argue that, as Russia is a Christian nation, while Japan is pagan, it is the duty of the Christian peoples — of all Christendom in fact — to aid Russia in her effort to crush Japan. It is a matter of regret to me, even of sorrow, to hear any such views, for we Japanese are not fighting in the East for religion; we are battling against one of the greatest of the world powers for the peace of Asia, as well as for the national existence of Japan.

I ask you now to examine with me, in the light of the logic and the facts, this argument of the people who hold that Japan must be crushed because she is "pagan," for that is the charge against her, and Russia supported because she is Christian, for Christian she is alleged to be. What is paganism, and what is Christianity? And which of these two powers is enabled to bear the test that shall range it on the side of higher civilization? Here I appeal to the candid judgment of any one present, on whatever side he may happen to be in his sympathies. First, let me say that the Japanese constitution, by special article, guarantees to every Japanese subject complete freedom of conscience and religion. In Japan the citizen is as free in religious matters as is the citizen in America, or in any country of Europe. While my country thus grants religious freedom to each of its citizens, it prevents no one from embracing the Christian faith, which is thus, politically speaking, tolerated. And now for the concrete illustrations.

When the *Variag* went down in Chemulpo harbor, our officers found in the hull of that vessel a number of shipwrecked men. They re-clothed the bodies of the unfortunates, and then buried them ashore, in accordance with the rites of the Christian religion, the foreign missionary at Chemulpo being present by our invitation, as well as the members of the foreign consulate,



to say nothing of the Japanese officers and sailors who attended the solemn ceremony. Meanwhile the wounded marines from the *Variag* had been transferred to our Red Cross Hospital in Japan, where they were attended to with the utmost care and kindness by our doctors and nurses. So impressed were the men by their treatment that some of them expressed their intention of remaining in Japan after the war was over, so that they might do some service for the country, and thus pay back the kindness shown to them in the hospital. These acts, on the part of Japan, were acknowledged by the Russian government, who sent us their message of thanks through the French Consul.

Now contrast this treatment of Russians by Japan with the treatment meted out to Japanese residents in Manchuria, in Siberia, and at Vladivostok by the Russians. I am sorry to find that an entirely different story; for our people in those places were maltreated, both by officials and civilians of Russian nationality; even when we sent a steamer to bring the Japanese home, the boat was detained without the slightest reason; while some of our compatriots were made to stand on the wharf shelterless, shivering with the cold, and lacking food. Now put the story of our treatment of the Russians against that of the Russian treatment of the Japanese, and ask yourselves, "Which is the Christian nation —

Russia or Japan?" I do not for a moment doubt what your answer will be. A moment's examination of the facts will suffice to show that in this war it is we who have acted like Christians, and the Russians who have behaved like pagans.

You remember the story in the New Testament of the Good Samaritan. A traveller was attacked by a thief, was wounded and—his money and treasures stolen—left bleeding by the wayside. Presently a Christian came by and saw the traveller in his sorry condition, but passed on without saying a word or bestowing any attention upon the wounded man. Afterwards came a Samaritan, who was a pagan. No sooner did he see the traveller bleeding by the wayside than he dismounted from his horse, bound up the man's wounds, and conveyed him to the nearest inn, where he paid all the expenses of attending to him and supplying him with medicine. Now Jesus heard that story of the Levite who was a Christian, and of the Samaritan who was a pagan, and what did he say? He could not but recognize that the deed of the Samaritan was a Christ-like deed, and this is well shown by his words; for he said, "Go and do thou likewise!" Well, in her treatment of the wounded sailors and the wounded soldiers, Japan acted as the Samaritan acted towards the traveller; and if Jesus were now upon earth he would say to Japan, "Thy deeds are Christ-

like!" Is anything more to be said, and can any one fail to recognize which of the two nations is pagan, and which is Christian? All this reminds me of the saying of Madame Roland, which I met with in reading the history of the French Revolution: "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!" and changing slightly that historic phrase, I myself am tempted to exclaim, "O Christianity, how many crimes are committed in thy name!" And I say it is a most cruel and unchristian thing in this war to reserve the epithet of "pagan" for the Japanese, while you bestow the name of "Christian" upon the Russians.

All I ask of reasonable and impartial men is that they shall study the facts as they are, and not allow themselves to be misled by merely sentimental attacks on the nations of the East. I want them to realize that in those so-called pagan nations there are men and women whose hearts throb with the same human sympathies, and whose minds acknowledge the same principles of right and wrong that we find among the people of the United States. The Japanese may differ from the American in longitude and in race history, but they have essentially the same emotions and the same methods of reasoning,—a fact which will be scarcely denied by those who believe that "of one blood" were made "all nations of the earth."

Let us now consider what has been called "the yellow peril," — a phrase of which I have heard and seen much since the outbreak of this war. What do they mean when they talk of the "yellow peril"? They mean that when Japan becomes supreme in the Orient she will unite under her banner all the peoples of Asia, and that through this combination Europe will be threatened by a peril which is called "yellow," because it will array the so-called "yellow" races against the races that are white. And they argue that, however just the cause of Japan may be in her struggle against Russia, Europe must not merely do nothing in the way of sympathizing with or helping her, but must side with Russia and aid her in so defeating and crushing Japan that she will never again be able to rise as an independent power. Here is another cruel conclusion reached from no basis of actuality or fact. Look for a moment at the origin of the phrase "yellow peril." It was manufactured by a certain treacherous diplomat and politician in order to arouse feelings of fear as well as the passion of hatred among the peoples of the West at the expense of the Japanese. Let me therefore remind you of the true history of the only "yellow peril" the world has ever had. For there was once a "yellow peril," and the nations suffered from it. The first "yellow peril" in history was the invasion of Europe by the Mongolians in the year

1241 A.D. Penetrating to Moscow, they continued their march into Austria, and swarmed into other parts of Europe, devastating and plundering wherever they went. After thus terrorizing Europe and ravaging its eastern territories, the Mongols directed their course to Japan. They reached our islands in 1268, and the results of the "yellow peril" there were far more terrible than any which Europe had experienced. For thirteen years subsequent to that date, up to 1281, we had the "yellow peril" with us in its most menacing form; at one time the Mongolians were in actual occupation of our northern coast. During the period of their stay they burned our villages, killed our women and children, and plundered us of our treasures, not leaving a single conceivable act of wickedness uncommitted. Such was the terror inspired by the "yellow peril" as we knew it, that even to-day in Japan it is customary to stop children from crying by telling them that the yellow man or the Mongol will get them. All the while the Japanese people resisted the invaders, and the patriotic defence of their country by our warriors enabled us to utterly rout and defeat the enemy, with the slaughter of 100,000 Mongolians, only three of whom were permitted to return to their homes alive. When, therefore, we hear people talk of the "yellow peril" in the East, with obvious reference to Japan, we are bound to reply by ask-

ing who it was that, by the gallantry of its people, crushed back the tide of Mongolian invasion, and saved Europe from the fiendish wickedness of the only "yellow peril" which the world has ever known? And if, ignoring the fact that Japan was thus once the saviour of Europe when Europe did not even know who had saved her, both Europe and America agree in fearing a modern "yellow peril," then I assert, without the slightest chance of being successfully contradicted, that Japan has far more reason to fear a "white" peril in the East than the world, or any part of it, has to anticipate danger from Japan. Observe the advance of the European nations into Asia. What are the extension of French Tonquin and the occupation of Kiow-Chan by Germany if not "white perils" for the Chinese empire? There is another "white peril" for China on her northern border in Russia's occupation of Manchuria, but it is far more of a "white peril" for Japan. We regard it as a real and dangerous menace to our national existence, not for a moment imaginary in character like the "yellow peril" now so much talked about in Europe and America. The phrase about the "yellow peril" — and I say it emphatically — is thus nothing more than a trick concocted by disingenuous and treacherous diplomats, not merely to disturb and bring to an end the cordial feelings which characterize the relations towards us of

the United States and England, but also to substitute for such feelings an attitude of antipathy on the part of those powers.

A glance now at the general situation. We are fighting this battle with no purpose of menacing Europe and America with any "yellow peril." Nor are we fighting for either race interests or religious interests. We are fighting to preserve the national existence of Japan, menaced as it is by the territorial aggrandizements of Russia, and by the aggressions she is continually making upon the frontiers and borders which our interests compel us to protect. Inspired by no war-like ambition, and no desire for the acquirement of new territory, Japan simply seeks in the present war to maintain the peace of Asia and conserve the influence of Anglo-American civilization in the East. These statements of mine find confirmation in the widely contrasted powers and resources of the two belligerents. Take first the matter of population. In Russia there are 140,000,000, while Japan has only 45,000,000. Russia, again, has a standing army numbering 4,600,000; the military forces of Japan do not exceed 675,000. Vastly superior also is Russia's naval equipment, represented by a tonnage of 488,000, whereas the tonnage of Japan's navy does not exceed 252,000. So far as actual fighting power and population are concerned, Japan is evidently no match for Russia, while in other

ways the resources of Russia are far superior to those of Japan. How, then, for the mere gratification of warlike ambition, or for the mere purposes of aggrandizement, could a small island power like Japan dare to face that gigantic and mightiest of the world powers, — Russia? It is evident that Japan would not go to war with such a power unless she were fighting for her very existence as a nation.

A word here about the commercial issues of the war. "What," I have heard people ask, "would happen if Japan were victorious in this war?" Becoming supreme in the East, would she not threaten the commerce of the world? In other words, would she not drive all Europeans and Americans from the continent of Asia and thus appropriate its commerce to her own selfish purposes?" The reply to such questions as these may be easily obtained by anybody who will study the history of the Japanese Empire during the past fifty years, nothing more being needed to show how unfounded are such apprehensions than a knowledge of the policy and progress of Japan in that period.

Just fifty-one years ago President Fillmore, of the United States, sent Commodore Perry to Japan. He took a message advising the Japanese to adopt the "open door" policy as regarded intercourse with other nations, honestly as well as earnestly urging upon Japan that this was the



best course for her to pursue. It was also represented to Japan that if she allowed the opportunity to pass, some other power might compel her, at the point of the bayonet or at the cannon's mouth, to open her ports. Finally, by means of the gentle suasion and advice which the United States brought to bear, Japan was induced to adopt the "open door" policy, which was forever accepted and established for Japan by the Emperor on his ascension to the throne in 1868. In his imperial oath the Emperor made this declaration: "Henceforth we shall seek knowledge and wisdom in the civilized world, and establish a national assembly where all the affairs of state are to be decided by public opinion." The advance which Japan was making became yet more evident after the imperial restoration of 1868, when we recognized the various departments of government, the educational system, the postal and telegraphic system, the sanitary system, the army and navy, — all these reorganized anew, that is to say, according to the principles of western civilization. To crown all, constitutional government was established for Japan in 1890, and ever since all Japanese subjects have enjoyed to the fullest extent the same civil, political, and religious liberty as is granted in the freest nations of the civilized world.

Now, after having thus adopted western civilization and assimilated our manners and customs

to those of the most advanced nations, we felt it our duty to do our utmost to extend these blessings to other oriental nations whom we could influence. Having ourselves benefited from the acquirements and experiences of the western countries, we felt ourselves bound in return to urge upon Korea and China, as the United States had urged upon us, the wisdom of adopting the "open door" policy towards foreign nations, that being the only policy by which an enlightened people could hope to advance along the path of self-development, at once securing its own well-being and contributing to maintain peace in the continent of Asia. We have made these representations to Korea and China for thirty years past, and have noted with satisfaction that the policy of the United States in Manchuria is practically identical with the policy of the Japanese government. Japan is really acting as the pioneer of Anglo-American civilization in the East. It is for this which we are fighting, and only this which is the meaning of the war.

I shall now say something about Russia's promises, and remind you of how she failed to fulfil them. We have only to examine her attitude towards the Manchurian question to find her declaring repeatedly her willingness to acknowledge the independence and integrity of China. As to Manchuria, the Russian government promised Japan as well as the American and European

governments that she would evacuate the province on October 8, 1903. Fully believing that she would fulfil the undertaking, the United States and Japan signed a treaty with China, of date October 6, — just two days before the anticipated evacuation, — to open Mukden and Antung to the commerce of the world. Russia had, by formal agreement, pledged her solemn word of honor to evacuate Manchuria on October 8, and as she calls herself a Christian nation we believed we could trust her implicitly; nor did we doubt for a moment that she would obey one of the ten commandments, which says, "Thou shall not bear false witness against thy neighbor." We did not suppose for an instant that she would break her agreement. Yet October 8 came round, and Russia did not evacuate Manchuria. Instead of evacuating the province, she actually increased her armaments there. Now, having failed to keep the commandment which warns against bearing false witness against one's neighbor, how dare she claim to be called a Christian nation? That she can keep on regarding herself as Christian, and that others can keep on calling her Christian, is to me a puzzle.

Why did she not keep her promise, solemnly made by the agreement to the United States and Japan? The reason was clearly stated in the March number of the "Journal of the American Asiatic Association." You may remember that

before the evacuation of Manchuria a secret negotiation was carried on by M. Plançon with the Chinese government at Peking, and that was afterwards followed up by M. Lessar, the Russian Minister. The "Journal" says: "The chief demands made by M. Plançon were that no portion of Chinese territory in Manchuria should be alienated or even sold or leased to any other but Russians; and that no new ports should be opened in Manchuria to foreign commerce, or consuls received there, without previous consultation with the Russian government. M. Lessar repeated the first of these demands, and added to it a further demand that after the evacuation at Manchuria all forestry, mining, and other similar valuable concessions should be granted only to Russian subjects."

The meaning of Russia's Manchurian policy is no longer a secret. Her aim was to dominate the province, to exclude from it all foreigners, and then to exploit it in her own selfish interests. It is equally clear that if Russia ever becomes supreme in Manchuria, no "open door" policy will ever be allowed sway there. After Russia has been permitted to obtain undivided supremacy in Manchuria, it will be impossible for the free commercial intercourse contemplated by the United States and Japan to assert itself in the province from which Russia pledged herself to withdraw. Nor is this all. According to Russian

law, while a foreign corporation in Russian territory can be sued by the Russians in her courts, they cannot sue Russian subjects or Russian companies in the same way. Therefore, in case Manchuria becomes Russian territory, all rights to sue in the courts will be denied to such foreign corporations as happen to be carrying on business in the province. Then, again, what will be the future of the religious works? If Manchuria passes into Russian hands, no Catholic or Protestant missionary will be permitted to do religious work there. Only last year, according to a report from the province, the Russian government very diplomatically requested Catholic and Protestant missionaries to withdraw from Manchuria and betake themselves into the territory of China proper, lest the very presence of foreign missionaries be a future cause of the outbreaks of anti-foreign bandits. Into a Russian Manchuria, you may depend upon it, no missionary will ever be admitted, in spite of the fact that missionaries have been carrying on religious work here for the past fifty years. Consider the amount of time, energy, and money that has been expended in missionary effort in both China and Japan. The Episcopal Asiatic Mission has already spent, up to the present, in the spiritual elevation of the oriental people, a sum amounting to \$4,166,000. Nor does the significance of this sum grow less when it is remembered that the Episcopal mis-

sionaries are not especially active in the East. Other denominations are much more enterprising, and it is a fair estimate to say that the cost of their missionary work in the Far East cannot be less than from \$30,000,000 to \$100,000,000. Let Korea and Manchuria once fall into the power of Russia, and the day of mission work in those territories is over, to say nothing of the involved loss of the immense amount of money and energy which were devoted to the opening up of Manchuria and Korea and China to the Christian religion. Just at the time when the missions are about to reap the fruit of those investments, Russia steps in and declares that whatever devotion, treasure, and time have been put into religious elevation of the East, it shall have no harvest, so far as she has the power to determine.

And now to sum up. This war, let me repeat, is neither racial nor religious in character. It is a battle for Japan's national existence; a struggle for the advancement of Anglo-American civilization in the East; a war undertaken to insure the peace of Asia. It is this temper and spirit that inspire her whole people. The feeling aroused throughout the empire by our just war is shown by the fact, that when the government issued its war loan, the amount was subscribed for five times over. Moreover, from all the parts of our Island Empire, the contributions to

the war fund have come in,—first by gift of the Emperor's gold chest, and then followed by the ancient Daimio nobility, and the wealthy classes. The farmer, the laborer, the tradesman, and the servant have eagerly handed in their savings. The very school children, hoarding up their pocket money, and adding to it the small sums given to them by their parents for the purchase of books or school implements, have also carried their offerings to the treasury department. This war will be long and terrible, and the whole people are ready for it. This is shown by the fact that when a soldier or sailor is sent to the front, his family is taken care of by his neighbors or by his village community. Landlords have made it a rule not to collect the rent from his family, and doctors have volunteered to treat the sick in his family without charge.

Furthermore, in anticipation of many thousand widows and orphans who must be left behind, we established a relief fund association to which contributions amounting to \$1,300,000 have already been made.

If Japan is defeated, there can be no future in the Orient for Christianity and Civilization. If Russia wins, the light of Religion and Freedom will fade out from that part of the world forever. It is for these reasons that the little nation of Japan, knowing well the giant might

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of the foe she has to face, is nerved, for the sake of freedom and civilization, with their heritage and promise of all that she holds most dear, to wage the present struggle to the last gasp of her endurance and her life.



[The following is the comment on Baron Kaneko's address, which appeared in the editorial of the "Boston Herald," May 2, 1904. — ED.]

#### A JAPANESE PUBLIC SPEAKER.

Such dear lovers of human speech in every shape of oratory are Americans, and so fond of analyzing and comparing the varied methods it resorts to, as to make it sure that the bare announcement of an address in Sanders Theatre, Cambridge, from so distinguished a Japanese statesman and jurist as Baron Kaneko, should, last Thursday evening, have gathered an exceptionally intelligent and thoughtful audience. Baron Kaneko was not there on the platform as immediate invited guest of Harvard University, — which, under existing circumstances, might not have been deemed internationally proper on the part of a great educational institution, — but as the invited guest of the Japan Club of Harvard, an association of patriotic young Japanese students of the college, along with a goodly number of their American fellow-students, warmly sympathizing with their national aspirations in this present crisis of their country's fate.

It was, however, well known that, though a son of the "Land of the Rising Sun," Baron

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Kaneko was also a graduate of Harvard. "Blood is thicker than water," — especially academic blood, ruddy with the red globules of football, the classics, Chief Justice Story, and ever revered Professor Langdale of the Cambridge law school. Besides, all knew that even before he was a baron Harvard had decorated Kentaro Kaneko for his distinguished services to his country with its own highest university honors. So, of course, all this did not in the least prejudice the minds of those present against anything he might have to say, or tend to muffle their hands in the resonance of their tumultuous claps.

How a speaker lives up to the subject and the occasion he takes in hand is the supreme test of an orator, or better yet, of the stamp of man he is in himself. Does he magnify or belittle his subject; does he lift it or degrade it? In reality, — call it anything one will, — an address to a club of Harvard Japanese students or what not, — this was in essence the pathetic plea for justice and mercy on the part of one bleeding nation menaced with brutal annihilation to another fair-play-loving nation, strong in the possession of its own inalienable rights. It is a theme one rarely hears treated in such a presence, involving as it does depth of passion seldom stirring the heart of a speaker. The simple occasion, then, was silently eloquent enough in itself to pre-enlist the sympathies of the assemblage.

Baron Kaneko's address furnished a rare opportunity to test the truth of the frequent assertion that repressed emotion acts more powerfully on others than that which seeks free vent in outcry; as, with the bereaved, the "tearless grief" that agitates more sensibly than floods of tears. By the deep-seated law of contraries, repressed emotion quickens the imagination of the onlooker to supply out of his own feelings that the lack of which is cravingly felt, and all such natively self-evoked emotion works more vitally than that which is prompted from without. Shakespeare's famous speech of Mark Antony over Cæsar's body is one long illustration of how the nearest way to set afire the passions of the Forum mob lies through such seemingly listless repression of the speaker's own, that, like a whirlwind fiercely rushing in to fill a vacuum, the cries and execrations of the populace will soon be heard rending the air in irrepressible wrath to do their own cursing for themselves, — always more enjoyable than having another do it for one.

From beginning to end — and it was nearly two hours long — Baron Kaneko's address was free from every trace of rhetorical declamation or vindictive passion, and was, on the external surface, the straightforward, logical discussion by a jurist and statesman of the points at issue between Japan and Russia. The speaker himself,

slight in figure, with an intellectual head and a face as sad as Hamlet's, confined himself to cold statistics more damning — as the audience seemed to feel — in their rebuttal of the claims of Russia than any amount of fiery invective. The naïve and innocent surprise of the Russian bear up-stream, and seated on a trembling avalanche of forts, siege guns, infantry, and Cossack cavalry, at having the peaceful waters disturbed for him by the Japanese lamb down-stream, was simply shown to have been an illogical surprise on his part, in view of the stupendous preparation he had made ahead against the possibility of any power with such little pattering feet so agitating the waters that they could be forced to run up hill. Still, all this was left as simple deduction to the mind of the hearer. The speaker never called Russia a bear, or Japan a lamb, or either of them by any such diplomatically discourteous or piously pharisaical a name. If the hearer felt inclined to indulge in any such *Æsopian* epithets, it must be solely on his own hook, and on the score of purely unimpassioned statistics which should seem to him to furnish ample warrant for swearing on strictly rational premises.

In this first illustration the keynote was struck of Baron Kaneko's method and manner of speech. Considering, moreover, the finesse with which it had to be done, and done, too, in a foreign tongue, in the use of which he had for twenty-

five years been out of practice, his success was truly remarkable. This style once adopted, the speaker never departed from it from start to finish. Though all felt what a lava flood of passion underlay the man, all that betrayed it revealed itself through the one note of subtle, evanescent, illusive irony inspired by statistics, and felt all the more in that it was not palpably expressed. Statistics, thus handled, may be made as inflaming as Pindaric odes. Thus, for example, in rebuttal of the plea that, in this war, the sympathies of Europe and America ought to be with Russia, because it was a war of Christianity against paganism, the delicate statistical irony with which he presented comparative tables of the way in which the Russians treated the poor Japanese wretches who fell into their hands at Vladivostok, and that in which the Japanese had treated the Russians in like plight, — and then, in comment on what Jesus himself regarded as genuine Christianity, recited the parable of the Good Samaritan, priest, levite, or pagan, — this summed up all the speaker had to say on purely doctrinal subjects. The statistics themselves became a touching parable.

But the quiet way in which Baron Kaneko locked tight, with a like statistical key of a hundred wards, what is called "The Open Door of the East," should Russia come to prevail, — locked it tight against missionaries, Catholic or

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Protestant, against consuls, shippers, mine owners, business enterprises, schools, and colleges, — was the crowning masterpiece of a lock-out that would fairly have left a bank safe manufacturer aghost at being thus beaten at his own trade. The way in which the dry bones of statistics became a skeleton key was a marvel.

Here, then, exemplified in Baron Kaneko, was a style of illusive public speaking that makes the hearer say what the speaker omits to say, which ought to have proved vastly instructive to the college boys, not to say to some of their professors in the rhetorical department. In its indirect directness was it Japanese in spirit? If so, Shakespeare's Mark Antony was a passed master in Japanese methods.



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